29 ideas
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
13451 | The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13452 | Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13449 | We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13450 | Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
13453 | Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
13448 | The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano] |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |